use anyhow::Result;
use bytes::Bytes;
use ostp_core::{OstpEvent, ProtocolAction, ProtocolConfig, ProtocolMachine};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use portable_atomic::AtomicU64;

/// Maximum number of concurrent authenticated sessions.
/// Excess handshake attempts are silently dropped -- no response, no state allocated.
const MAX_SESSIONS: usize = 1024;

pub enum DispatchOutcome {
    Unauthorized,
    Accepted {
        responses: Vec<Bytes>,
        app_payloads: Vec<(u32, u16, Bytes)>, // session_id, stream_id, payload
        peer_addr: SocketAddr,
    },
}

/// Per-user traffic statistics.
pub struct UserStats {
    pub bytes_up: AtomicU64,
    pub bytes_down: AtomicU64,
    pub connections: AtomicU64,
    pub limit_bytes: Option<u64>,
    pub created_at: std::time::SystemTime,
}

impl UserStats {
    pub fn new(limit: Option<u64>) -> Self {
        Self {
            bytes_up: AtomicU64::new(0),
            bytes_down: AtomicU64::new(0),
            connections: AtomicU64::new(0),
            limit_bytes: limit,
            created_at: std::time::SystemTime::now(),
        }
    }

    pub fn is_over_limit(&self) -> bool {
        if let Some(limit) = self.limit_bytes {
            let total = self.bytes_up.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
                + self.bytes_down.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
            total >= limit
        } else {
            false
        }
    }
}

/// Snapshot of user stats for API responses.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
pub struct UserStatsSnapshot {
    pub access_key: String,
    pub name: Option<String>,
    pub bytes_up: u64,
    pub bytes_down: u64,
    pub connections: u64,
    pub limit_bytes: Option<u64>,
    pub online: bool,
}

pub struct PeerState {
    pub machine: ProtocolMachine,
    pub last_addr: SocketAddr,
    pub obfuscation_key: [u8; 8],
    pub last_seen: std::time::Instant,
    pub access_key: String,
}

pub struct Dispatcher {
    peer_machines: HashMap<u32, PeerState>,
    addr_to_session: HashMap<SocketAddr, u32>,
    machine_config: ProtocolConfig,
    access_keys: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, crate::api::UserMeta>>>,
    user_stats: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, Arc<UserStats>>>>,
    replay_cache: std::collections::HashMap<Vec<u8>, u64>,
    roaming_tokens: f64,
    last_token_regen: std::time::Instant,
}

#[allow(dead_code)]
impl Dispatcher {
    pub fn new(machine_config: ProtocolConfig, access_keys: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, crate::api::UserMeta>>>) -> Self {
        let mut initial_stats = HashMap::new();
        for (key, meta) in access_keys.read().unwrap().iter() {
            initial_stats.insert(key.clone(), Arc::new(UserStats::new(meta.limit_bytes)));
        }
        Self {
            peer_machines: HashMap::new(),
            addr_to_session: HashMap::new(),
            machine_config,
            access_keys,
            user_stats: Arc::new(RwLock::new(initial_stats)),
            replay_cache: std::collections::HashMap::new(),
            roaming_tokens: 50.0,
            last_token_regen: std::time::Instant::now(),
        }
    }

    /// Returns a shared reference to user stats for the Management API.
    pub fn user_stats_ref(&self) -> Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, Arc<UserStats>>>> {
        self.user_stats.clone()
    }

    /// Snapshot all user stats for API responses.
    pub fn snapshot_all_users(&self) -> Vec<UserStatsSnapshot> {
        let stats = self.user_stats.read().unwrap();
        let online_keys: std::collections::HashSet<String> = self.peer_machines.values()
            .map(|ps| ps.access_key.clone())
            .collect();
        stats.iter().map(|(key, us)| UserStatsSnapshot {
            access_key: key.clone(),
            name: None,
            bytes_up: us.bytes_up.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
            bytes_down: us.bytes_down.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
            connections: us.connections.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
            limit_bytes: us.limit_bytes,
            online: online_keys.contains(key),
        }).collect()
    }

    /// Get or create stats entry for a user key.
    fn get_or_create_user_stats(&self, key: &str) -> Arc<UserStats> {
        let stats = self.user_stats.read().unwrap();
        if let Some(existing) = stats.get(key) {
            return existing.clone();
        }
        drop(stats);
        
        let limit_bytes = self.access_keys.read().unwrap().get(key).and_then(|m| m.limit_bytes);
        
        let mut stats = self.user_stats.write().unwrap();
        stats.entry(key.to_string())
            .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(UserStats::new(limit_bytes)))
            .clone()
    }

    /// Set traffic limit for a user.
    pub fn set_user_limit(&self, key: &str, limit: Option<u64>) {
        let mut stats = self.user_stats.write().unwrap();
        let entry = stats.entry(key.to_string())
            .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(UserStats::new(limit)));
        // Replace the entry with new limit (stats reset)
        *entry = Arc::new(UserStats {
            bytes_up: AtomicU64::new(entry.bytes_up.load(Ordering::Relaxed)),
            bytes_down: AtomicU64::new(entry.bytes_down.load(Ordering::Relaxed)),
            connections: AtomicU64::new(entry.connections.load(Ordering::Relaxed)),
            limit_bytes: limit,
            created_at: entry.created_at,
        });
    }

    /// Active session count.
    pub fn active_sessions(&self) -> usize {
        self.peer_machines.len()
    }

    pub fn on_datagram(&mut self, peer: SocketAddr, packet: Bytes) -> Result<DispatchOutcome> {
        if packet.len() < 4 {
            return Ok(DispatchOutcome::Unauthorized);
        }

        let mut session_id_opt = None;

        if let Some(&sid) = self.addr_to_session.get(&peer) {
            if let Some(peer_state) = self.peer_machines.get(&sid) {
                let mut header = [0u8; 12];
                if packet.len() >= 12 {
                    header.copy_from_slice(&packet[0..12]);
                    let ciphertext = &packet[12..];
                    ostp_core::crypto::deobfuscate_header_inplace(&mut header, ciphertext, &peer_state.obfuscation_key, false);
                    let candidate_sid = u32::from_be_bytes([header[0], header[1], header[2], header[3]]);
                    if candidate_sid == sid {
                        session_id_opt = Some(sid);
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        if session_id_opt.is_none() {
            // Token Bucket rate limiter: mitigate seamless roaming CPU DoS vector
            let now = std::time::Instant::now();
            let elapsed = now.duration_since(self.last_token_regen).as_secs_f64();
            self.last_token_regen = now;
            self.roaming_tokens = (self.roaming_tokens + elapsed * 50.0).min(50.0);

            if self.roaming_tokens >= 1.0 {
                self.roaming_tokens -= 1.0;

                // Try seamless roaming over all peers
                for (&sid, peer_state) in &self.peer_machines {
                    if packet.len() >= 12 {
                        let mut header = [0u8; 12];
                        header.copy_from_slice(&packet[0..12]);
                        let ciphertext = &packet[12..];
                        ostp_core::crypto::deobfuscate_header_inplace(&mut header, ciphertext, &peer_state.obfuscation_key, false);
                        let candidate_sid = u32::from_be_bytes([header[0], header[1], header[2], header[3]]);
                        if candidate_sid == sid {
                            session_id_opt = Some(sid);
                            break;
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        if let Some(session_id) = session_id_opt {
            let key_opt = self.peer_machines.get(&session_id).map(|ps| ps.access_key.clone());
            if let Some(access_key) = key_opt {
                // Check if key is still valid and not over limit
                let key_valid = self.access_keys.read().unwrap().contains_key(&access_key);
                let user_stats = self.get_or_create_user_stats(&access_key);
                if !key_valid || user_stats.is_over_limit() {
                    tracing::info!("Dropping session {} for key {} (valid={}, over_limit={})",
                        session_id, access_key, key_valid, user_stats.is_over_limit());
                    self.drop_session(session_id);
                    return Ok(DispatchOutcome::Unauthorized);
                }
            }

            if let Some(peer_state) = self.peer_machines.get_mut(&session_id) {

                if peer_state.last_addr != peer {
                    tracing::info!("Client roamed: session {} from {} to {}", session_id, peer_state.last_addr, peer);
                    self.addr_to_session.remove(&peer_state.last_addr);
                }
                peer_state.last_addr = peer;
                peer_state.last_seen = std::time::Instant::now();
                self.addr_to_session.insert(peer, session_id);
                
                // Track inbound bytes per user
                let key = peer_state.access_key.clone();
                track_user_bytes_up(&self.user_stats, &self.access_keys, &key, packet.len() as u64);

                let action = match peer_state.machine.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(packet)) {
                    Ok(a) => a,
                    Err(e) => {
                        tracing::warn!("Protocol error for session {}: {}", session_id, e);
                        return Ok(DispatchOutcome::Unauthorized);
                    }
                };

                let mut responses = Vec::new();
                let mut app_payloads = Vec::new();

                fn collect_action(
                    act: ProtocolAction,
                    sid: u32,
                    resps: &mut Vec<Bytes>,
                    loads: &mut Vec<(u32, u16, Bytes)>,
                ) {
                    match act {
                        ProtocolAction::SendDatagram(frame) => {
                            resps.push(frame);
                        }
                        ProtocolAction::DeliverApp(stream_id, data) => {
                            loads.push((sid, stream_id, data));
                        }
                        ProtocolAction::Multiple(list) => {
                            for item in list {
                                collect_action(item, sid, resps, loads);
                            }
                        }
                        _ => {}
                    }
                }

                collect_action(action, session_id, &mut responses, &mut app_payloads);

                return Ok(DispatchOutcome::Accepted {
                    responses,
                    app_payloads,
                    peer_addr: peer,
                });
            }
        }

        // Not an existing session — try each registered access key's derived obfuscation key
        let keys_snapshot: Vec<String> = self.access_keys.read().unwrap().keys().cloned().collect();

        for candidate_key in keys_snapshot {
            let secrets = ostp_core::crypto::derive_all_secrets(candidate_key.as_bytes());

            // Decode the session_id using this key's obfuscation
            // The handshake mask is derived from the Noise payload at bytes [6..],
            // so we must deobfuscate the full packet, not just the header.
            if packet.len() < 7 { continue; }
            let mut trial = packet.to_vec();
            ostp_core::crypto::deobfuscate_packet_inplace(&mut trial, &secrets.obfuscation_key, true);
            let candidate_session_id = u32::from_be_bytes([trial[0], trial[1], trial[2], trial[3]]);

            let mut cfg = self.machine_config.clone();
            cfg.session_id = candidate_session_id;
            cfg.psk = secrets.psk;
            cfg.handshake_payload = vec![];
            cfg.obfuscation_key = secrets.obfuscation_key;
            cfg.handshake_pad_min = secrets.handshake_pad_min;
            cfg.handshake_pad_max = secrets.handshake_pad_max;

            let mut machine = match ProtocolMachine::new(cfg) {
                Ok(m) => m,
                Err(e) => {
                    tracing::warn!("Failed to create protocol machine for key trial: {}", e);
                    continue;
                }
            };
            let action = match machine.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(packet.clone())) {
                Ok(a) => a,
                Err(_) => continue,
            };

            if let ProtocolAction::HandshakePayload(payload, response_opt) = action {
                if payload.len() >= 12 {
                    let mut ts_bytes = [0_u8; 8];
                    ts_bytes.copy_from_slice(&payload[..8]);
                    let ts = u64::from_be_bytes(ts_bytes);

                    let mut sid_bytes = [0_u8; 4];
                    sid_bytes.copy_from_slice(&payload[8..12]);
                    let sid_from_payload = u32::from_be_bytes(sid_bytes);

                    if sid_from_payload != candidate_session_id {
                        continue;
                    }

                    let key_bytes = &payload[12..];
                    if let Ok(key_from_payload) = std::str::from_utf8(key_bytes) {
                        // The key embedded in the payload must match the candidate key we decoded with
                        if key_from_payload != candidate_key {
                            continue;
                        }

                        let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
                            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
                            .unwrap_or_default()
                            .as_secs();

                        let drift = (now as i64 - ts as i64).abs();
                        if drift > 300 {
                            tracing::warn!("Handshake rejected: timestamp drift {}s exceeds 300s limit (peer={})", drift, peer);
                            continue;
                        }

                        if !self.replay_cache.contains_key(&payload.to_vec()) {
                            if self.replay_cache.len() >= 100_000 {
                                tracing::warn!("Replay cache full (100000 entries), rejecting handshake from {}", peer);
                                return Ok(DispatchOutcome::Unauthorized);
                            }
                            if self.peer_machines.len() >= MAX_SESSIONS {
                                tracing::warn!("Max sessions reached ({}), rejecting handshake from {}", MAX_SESSIONS, peer);
                                return Ok(DispatchOutcome::Unauthorized);
                            }

                            self.replay_cache.insert(payload.to_vec(), ts);

                            machine.set_session_keys(candidate_session_id, secrets.obfuscation_key);

                            // Track per-user connection count
                            let user_stats = self.get_or_create_user_stats(&candidate_key);
                            user_stats.connections.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);

                            // Check traffic limit before accepting
                            if user_stats.is_over_limit() {
                                tracing::warn!("User {} exceeded traffic limit, rejecting handshake from {}", candidate_key, peer);
                                return Ok(DispatchOutcome::Unauthorized);
                            }

                            self.peer_machines.insert(candidate_session_id, PeerState {
                                machine,
                                last_addr: peer,
                                obfuscation_key: secrets.obfuscation_key,
                                last_seen: std::time::Instant::now(),
                                access_key: candidate_key.clone(),
                            });
                            self.addr_to_session.insert(peer, candidate_session_id);

                            tracing::info!("New session authenticated: sid={} peer={} (active_sessions={}, replay_cache={})",
                                candidate_session_id, peer, self.peer_machines.len(), self.replay_cache.len()
                            );

                            return Ok(DispatchOutcome::Accepted {
                                responses: response_opt.into_iter().collect(),
                                app_payloads: Vec::new(),
                                peer_addr: peer,
                            });
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }

        Ok(DispatchOutcome::Unauthorized)
    }

    pub fn outbound_to_session(&mut self, session_id: u32, stream_id: u16, payload: Bytes) -> Result<Option<(Bytes, SocketAddr)>> {
        let peer_state = if let Some(existing) = self.peer_machines.get_mut(&session_id) {
            existing
        } else {
            return Ok(None);
        };

        let addr = peer_state.last_addr;
        let key = peer_state.access_key.clone();
        match peer_state.machine.on_event(OstpEvent::Outbound(stream_id, payload))? {
            ProtocolAction::SendDatagram(frame) => {
                // Track outbound bytes per user
                track_user_bytes_down(&self.user_stats, &self.access_keys, &key, frame.len() as u64);
                Ok(Some((frame, addr)))
            }
            _ => Ok(None),
        }
    }

    pub fn on_tick(&mut self) -> (Vec<(Bytes, SocketAddr)>, Vec<u32>) {
        // Purge expired handshakes from replay cache (older than 5 min drift allowance)
        let current_sys_time = std::time::SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
            .unwrap_or_default()
            .as_secs();
        self.replay_cache.retain(|_, &mut ts| (current_sys_time as i64 - ts as i64).abs() <= 300);

        let mut frames = Vec::new();
        let mut expired = Vec::new();
        let now = std::time::Instant::now();
        let timeout_dur = std::time::Duration::from_secs(300); // 5 minutes session timeout

        // Gather expired or invalid sessions
        for (&sid, peer_state) in &self.peer_machines {
            let key_valid = self.access_keys.read().unwrap().contains_key(&peer_state.access_key);
            let user_stats = self.get_or_create_user_stats(&peer_state.access_key);
            if now.duration_since(peer_state.last_seen) > timeout_dur || !key_valid || user_stats.is_over_limit() {
                expired.push(sid);
            }
        }

        // Clear expired/invalid sessions from internal state
        for sid in &expired {
            let peer_state_opt = self.peer_machines.get(sid);
            let reason = if let Some(ps) = peer_state_opt {
                let key_valid = self.access_keys.read().unwrap().contains_key(&ps.access_key);
                let user_stats = self.get_or_create_user_stats(&ps.access_key);
                if now.duration_since(ps.last_seen) > timeout_dur {
                    "inactive >5min"
                } else if !key_valid {
                    "key deleted"
                } else if user_stats.is_over_limit() {
                    "traffic limit exceeded"
                } else {
                    "unknown"
                }
            } else {
                "unknown"
            };
            tracing::info!("Session {} closed ({}), releasing", sid, reason);
            self.drop_session(*sid);
        }

        // Drive ticks for remaining active sessions
        for peer_state in self.peer_machines.values_mut() {
            let action = match peer_state.machine.on_event(OstpEvent::Tick) {
                Ok(a) => a,
                Err(e) => {
                    tracing::warn!("Tick error for session: {}", e);
                    continue;
                }
            };

            let mut queue = vec![action];
            while let Some(current) = queue.pop() {
                match current {
                    ProtocolAction::Multiple(list) => {
                        for item in list {
                            queue.push(item);
                        }
                    }
                    ProtocolAction::SendDatagram(frame) => {
                        frames.push((frame, peer_state.last_addr));
                    }
                    _ => {}
                }
            }
        }

        (frames, expired)
    }

    pub fn drop_session(&mut self, session_id: u32) {
        if let Some(state) = self.peer_machines.remove(&session_id) {
            self.addr_to_session.remove(&state.last_addr);
        }
    }
}

// Free functions to avoid borrow-checker conflicts when tracking stats
// while holding a mutable reference to peer_machines.

fn get_or_create_stats(
    user_stats: &Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, Arc<UserStats>>>>,
    access_keys: &Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, crate::api::UserMeta>>>,
    key: &str,
) -> Arc<UserStats> {
    {
        let stats = user_stats.read().unwrap();
        if let Some(existing) = stats.get(key) {
            return existing.clone();
        }
    }
    
    let limit_bytes = access_keys.read().unwrap().get(key).and_then(|m| m.limit_bytes);
    
    let mut stats = user_stats.write().unwrap();
    stats.entry(key.to_string())
        .or_insert_with(|| Arc::new(UserStats::new(limit_bytes)))
        .clone()
}

fn track_user_bytes_up(
    user_stats: &Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, Arc<UserStats>>>>,
    access_keys: &Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, crate::api::UserMeta>>>,
    key: &str,
    bytes: u64,
) {
    let stats = get_or_create_stats(user_stats, access_keys, key);
    stats.bytes_up.fetch_add(bytes, Ordering::Relaxed);
}

fn track_user_bytes_down(
    user_stats: &Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, Arc<UserStats>>>>,
    access_keys: &Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, crate::api::UserMeta>>>,
    key: &str,
    bytes: u64,
) {
    let stats = get_or_create_stats(user_stats, access_keys, key);
    stats.bytes_down.fetch_add(bytes, Ordering::Relaxed);
}