The core bug: server sent 5 TLS records in server_hello but client only
read the first one (ServerHello), then passed remaining bytes (CCS + fake
records) into RealityStream. RealityStream saw 0x14 (CCS) != 0x17 and
immediately returned an error, killing the connection.
Changes:
- reality.rs: append ChangeCipherSpec after ClientHello (RFC 8446 D.4)
export REALITY_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_RECORDS=5 constant
- xhttp.rs: drain all 5 server handshake records before creating RealityStream
- uot.rs: rebuild server_hello as proper 5-record TLS 1.3 flight:
ServerHello + CCS + fake EE (108B) + fake Cert (812B) + fake Fin (52B)
drain client CCS from raw stream before wrapping in RealityStream
- Flutter: Hide 'DNS Server' field and force '10.1.0.1' if connection link contains owndns=true
- Flutter: Remove 'Use Provider DNS' toggle to eliminate client-side choice
- Server (relay.rs): Intercept DNS queries targeting '10.1.0.1:53' and process them via internal DnsServer if DNS is enabled
- Server (api.rs): Continue appending owndns=true to subscription links to enforce internal DNS logic on clients
- ostp-server/relay.rs: remove DNS port 53 interception — DNS queries
now pass through to the actual DNS server as regular TCP connections
- ostp-client/native_handler.rs (Windows): add explicit gateway/32 route
via real interface BEFORE setting default route via TUN to prevent loop
- ostp-client/native_handler.rs (Linux): properly detect real gateway and
add default route via TUN with metric 10 after server IP exclusion
- Remove redundant extra DNS host routes from Windows setup script
- Boxed HandshakeState in NoiseSession to reduce enum variant sizes
- Used is_ok() instead of let Ok(_) pattern
- Applied automatic clippy fixes for minor warnings
Applied Kerckhoffs's principle: the protocol's security and obfuscation
now depend SOLELY on the access key. An adversary who reverse-engineers
the binary cannot build a DPI filter without knowing the key.
Changes:
- Replaced hardcoded salt string ('-ostp-psk-salt') with HKDF-SHA256.
The salt is now derived from the key hash itself — no protocol-specific
strings remain in the binary.
- Unified all secret derivation into derive_all_secrets() which produces
PSK, obfuscation key, and handshake padding range from a single HKDF
invocation.
- Handshake padding range is now key-derived: different access keys
produce different size distributions (min: 16-79, max: +48..+175).
A universal size-based filter is impossible without the key.
- HKDF-SHA256 (RFC 5869) implemented inline using existing hmac+sha2
dependencies — no new crate required.
What remains identifiable in the binary:
- 'Noise_NNpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s' — standard Noise pattern
string, shared with many other projects, NOT OSTP-specific.
- Generic HMAC/SHA-256/ChaCha20-Poly1305 code — standard crypto
primitives used by millions of applications.
Previously handshake obfuscation used a FIXED mask derived from
HMAC(obf_key, u64::MAX). This meant bytes [4..6] (noise_len XOR
fixed_mask) produced the SAME 2-byte value on every handshake from
the same access key — a correlation fingerprint for DPI.
Now BOTH data and handshake packets use the same payload-sampling
approach:
mask = HMAC-SHA256(obf_key, payload_sample[0..32])
For data packets: payload_sample = AEAD ciphertext (random per packet)
For handshake packets: payload_sample = Noise ephemeral key (random per connection)
Result: every single byte on the wire is cryptographically independent
across packets. No fixed patterns, no correlation between connections.
Wire analysis after this change:
- Packet sizes: random (84-182 for handshake, variable for data)
- All header bytes: unique per packet (XOR with unique HMAC mask)
- Payload bytes: AEAD ciphertext / Noise handshake (indistinguishable from random)
- No protocol signatures, no version fields, no magic bytes visible on wire
The previous commit added random padding after Noise handshake payloads
but the receiver passed the entire raw buffer (including padding) to
snow::read_handshake(), which cannot handle trailing bytes.
New wire format:
[session_id:4][noise_len:2][noise_payload:N][random_padding:32-128]
Changes:
- wrap_datagram_handshake: puts noise_len (u16 BE) at bytes [4..6]
before the Noise payload, followed by 32-128 random padding bytes
- handle_inbound: reads noise_len from [4..6], passes only
raw_vec[6..6+noise_len] to snow, ignoring trailing padding
- obfuscation: handshake mask extended from 4 to 6 bytes to also
cover the noise_len field (prevents DPI from seeing constant u16)
- dispatcher: key-trial loop updated to deobfuscate 6-byte header
Both client and server now produce/consume the same padded format.
- Removed stale KeyExchange re-export from crypto/mod.rs (kex.rs
only exports HybridSharedSecret and HybridKex after stub refactor)
- Removed unused imports in ostp-server/lib.rs (AsyncWriteExt,
tcp::OwnedWriteHalf)
- Suppressed dead_code warning on HelperMsg::Log variant (IPC spec)
- Verified: cargo check passes with zero errors and zero warnings
- Unified log prefix to [ostp] across all modules (was [OSTP Core],
[ostp-server], [ostp-client], [client], [bridge])
- Removed informal/casual phrasing from all user-visible messages
- Startup messages are clean and concise (mode, server, status)
- Error messages are actionable without being alarming
- Essential server logs (client connect/disconnect) always visible
- Essential client logs (connection status, errors) always visible
- TUN tunnel messages consistent across Windows and Linux
- Removed noisy eprintln from UDP reader hot path
- Status format: [ostp] Status: Connected (rtt=12.3ms)
ospab