fix(protocol): recover from an unrecoverable gap instead of freezing forever

The freeze users hit every few minutes: traffic drops to 0 B/s, the RTT
readout sticks at its last value, and only a manual reconnect clears it.

Delivery is gated on expected_recv_nonce, so one missing frame holds back
every frame behind it. That is correct only while the sender can still
retransmit — but the sender drops a frame from sent_history once it passes
max_retries + 2 attempts (zombie eviction in handle_tick). Past that point
the frame no longer exists anywhere and both sides deadlock: the receiver
buffers indefinitely and NACKs a nonce nobody can resend.

The watchdog could not save it, which is why it froze rather than
reconnecting. Retransmits, ACKs and NACKs keep arriving throughout, so the
client's last_valid_recv keeps refreshing and its 25s stall detector never
fires. The frozen RTT has the same cause: Pong travels in a Data frame,
stuck behind the very gap it would have reported.

The machinery for this was half-built: last_recv_advance was declared,
initialised and written on every advance, and its doc comment describes
exactly this recovery — but nothing ever read it, and a warning elsewhere
already referred to "gap recovery" that did not exist.

So implement it. Once the sequence has been stuck longer than the sender's
retransmit budget could plausibly last (8x the live RTO, clamped to 2..10s
so fast links do not discard merely-late frames and slow ones still
unblock), skip to the lowest buffered nonce, drain, and mark an ACK
pending so the peer stops retransmitting into a void.

This runs on the inbound path, not on Tick, for two reasons: both tick
handlers discard DeliverApp actions (client bridge.rs and server
dispatcher.rs match only SendDatagram/Multiple), and inbound frames keep
flowing all through the stall, so the path is reliably reached.

Skipping the hole drops one frame's payload — one RelayMessage, a chunk of
a single stream. That is a real cost, paid only when the data was already
lost for good, against a tunnel that otherwise stays dead until the user
intervenes.

Both tests were confirmed to fail without the fix (0 frames released
instead of 2), so they pin the deadlock rather than just the happy path.
This commit is contained in:
ospab 2026-07-29 19:56:09 +03:00
parent e7a4f2b4a4
commit 77e42b77f7
1 changed files with 203 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@ -102,6 +102,17 @@ pub struct ProtocolMachine {
_mtu: usize, _mtu: usize,
} }
// ── Gap recovery (see `ProtocolMachine::recover_stalled_gap`) ────────────────
// How long the receive sequence may sit stuck behind a missing frame, with
// later frames already buffered, before that frame is declared unrecoverable
// and skipped. Derived from the live RTO so it scales with the path instead of
// guessing, then clamped: the floor keeps a fast link from discarding a frame
// that is merely late, the ceiling bounds how long a stall can be visible to
// the user before the tunnel unblocks itself.
const GAP_RECOVERY_RTO_MULTIPLIER: u32 = 8;
const GAP_RECOVERY_MIN: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
const GAP_RECOVERY_MAX: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
#[derive(Debug, Clone)] #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct SentFrame { struct SentFrame {
nonce: u64, nonce: u64,
@ -296,7 +307,107 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
Ok(ProtocolAction::HandshakePayload(Bytes::from(extracted_payload), response)) Ok(ProtocolAction::HandshakePayload(Bytes::from(extracted_payload), response))
} }
/// Restores liveness when the receive sequence is stuck behind a frame that
/// can never arrive.
///
/// Delivery is gated on `expected_recv_nonce`, so a single missing frame
/// holds back every later frame. That is correct *while the sender can still
/// retransmit* — but the sender drops a frame from `sent_history` once it
/// exceeds `max_retries + 2` attempts (see the zombie eviction in
/// `handle_tick`). After that the frame is gone for good and the two sides
/// deadlock: the receiver buffers forever and NACKs a nonce nobody can
/// resend.
///
/// That deadlock is invisible to the keepalive watchdog, which is why it
/// presented as a hard freeze rather than a reconnect: retransmits, ACKs and
/// NACKs keep flowing, so the client's `last_valid_recv` keeps refreshing and
/// its stall detector never fires. The RTT readout freezes at its last value
/// for the same reason — Pong rides in a Data frame stuck behind the gap.
///
/// So: once we have been stuck long enough that retransmission has provably
/// given up, skip to the lowest buffered nonce and drain. This drops the
/// missing frame's payload (one RelayMessage — a chunk of one stream), which
/// is a real cost, but the alternative is a permanently dead tunnel.
fn recover_stalled_gap(&mut self) -> Vec<ProtocolAction> {
let mut recovered = Vec::new();
if self.reorder_buffer.is_empty() {
return recovered;
}
// Wait out the sender's full retransmit budget before giving up, so a
// frame that is merely late is never discarded. The sender backs off
// exponentially, so key this off the live RTO estimate rather than a
// flat constant, with a floor that keeps low-RTT links from skipping
// too eagerly and a ceiling that bounds the visible freeze.
let timeout = self
.cc
.rto()
.saturating_mul(GAP_RECOVERY_RTO_MULTIPLIER)
.clamp(GAP_RECOVERY_MIN, GAP_RECOVERY_MAX);
if self.last_recv_advance.elapsed() < timeout {
return recovered;
}
let Some(&resume_at) = self.reorder_buffer.keys().next() else {
return recovered;
};
let skipped = resume_at.saturating_sub(self.expected_recv_nonce);
tracing::warn!(
"Gap recovery: no progress for {:?}; skipping {} unrecoverable frame(s) \
(nonce {} -> {}) to unblock the session",
self.last_recv_advance.elapsed(),
skipped,
self.expected_recv_nonce,
resume_at
);
self.expected_recv_nonce = resume_at;
while let Some(buffered) = self.reorder_buffer.remove(&self.expected_recv_nonce) {
recovered.push(buffered);
match self.expected_recv_nonce.checked_add(1) {
Some(next) => self.expected_recv_nonce = next,
// u64 nonce space exhausted: stop draining rather than wrap.
// The session is finished either way; the caller's next decrypt
// will fail and tear it down.
None => break,
}
}
self.last_recv_advance = Instant::now();
// The peer must learn the sequence moved on, or it will keep
// retransmitting into the void.
self.ack_pending = true;
recovered
}
fn handle_data_inbound(&mut self, raw_vec: &[u8]) -> Result<ProtocolAction, ProtocolError> { fn handle_data_inbound(&mut self, raw_vec: &[u8]) -> Result<ProtocolAction, ProtocolError> {
// Check for a stalled gap before classifying this frame, so the rest of
// the function sees an already-advanced `expected_recv_nonce`. Runs here
// rather than on Tick because both tick handlers discard DeliverApp
// actions, and because inbound frames keep arriving throughout the stall
// (retransmits/ACKs/NACKs/keepalives) — so this path is reliably reached.
let recovered = self.recover_stalled_gap();
let result = self.handle_data_inbound_frame(raw_vec)?;
if recovered.is_empty() {
return Ok(result);
}
// Recovered payloads are older than anything this frame produces, so
// they go first to preserve delivery order.
let mut all = recovered;
match result {
ProtocolAction::Noop => {}
ProtocolAction::Multiple(list) => all.extend(list),
single => all.push(single),
}
Ok(if all.len() == 1 {
all.pop().unwrap()
} else {
ProtocolAction::Multiple(all)
})
}
fn handle_data_inbound_frame(&mut self, raw_vec: &[u8]) -> Result<ProtocolAction, ProtocolError> {
if raw_vec.len() < 12 { if raw_vec.len() < 12 {
return Err(ProtocolError::Framing("data datagram too short".to_string())); return Err(ProtocolError::Framing("data datagram too short".to_string()));
} }
@ -971,4 +1082,96 @@ mod tests {
let _ = client.on_event(OstpEvent::Tick).unwrap(); let _ = client.on_event(OstpEvent::Tick).unwrap();
let _ = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Tick).unwrap(); let _ = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Tick).unwrap();
} }
/// Count how many application payloads an action tree actually delivers.
fn delivered_payloads(action: &ProtocolAction) -> Vec<Bytes> {
match action {
ProtocolAction::DeliverApp(_, data) => vec![data.clone()],
ProtocolAction::Multiple(list) => list.iter().flat_map(delivered_payloads).collect(),
_ => Vec::new(),
}
}
/// Build `count` data frames on `client`, returning them without delivering
/// any — lets a test choose which ones to "lose" in transit.
fn make_data_frames(client: &mut ProtocolMachine, count: u8) -> Vec<Bytes> {
(0..count)
.map(|i| {
let payload = Bytes::from(vec![i; 32]);
match client.on_event(OstpEvent::Outbound(1, payload)).unwrap() {
ProtocolAction::SendDatagram(d) => d,
_ => panic!("expected SendDatagram for frame {i}"),
}
})
.collect()
}
/// The freeze this fixes: a frame is lost, the sender eventually stops
/// retransmitting it, and the receiver — which gates delivery on
/// `expected_recv_nonce` — waits for it forever. Every later frame piles up
/// undelivered while the transport itself stays healthy, so nothing upstream
/// notices. Recovery must eventually skip the hole and release the backlog.
#[test]
fn test_gap_recovery_releases_permanently_stalled_frames() {
let (mut client, mut server) = do_handshake();
let frames = make_data_frames(&mut client, 4);
// Frame 0 arrives in order and is delivered straight through.
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[0].clone())).unwrap();
assert_eq!(delivered_payloads(&action).len(), 1, "in-order frame should deliver");
// Frame 1 is lost. 2 and 3 arrive but must be held back — delivering them
// now would reorder the stream.
for idx in [2usize, 3] {
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[idx].clone())).unwrap();
assert!(
delivered_payloads(&action).is_empty(),
"frame {idx} must stay buffered behind the missing frame"
);
}
// Stand in for "the sender exhausted its retries and dropped frame 1":
// the sequence has not advanced for longer than the recovery timeout.
server.last_recv_advance = Instant::now() - GAP_RECOVERY_MAX - Duration::from_secs(1);
// The next inbound frame (a retransmitted duplicate, which is exactly what
// a real stalled session keeps receiving) must unblock the backlog.
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[0].clone())).unwrap();
let delivered = delivered_payloads(&action);
assert_eq!(
delivered.len(),
2,
"both buffered frames must be released once the gap is declared unrecoverable"
);
// ...and in order: frame 2 before frame 3.
assert_eq!(delivered[0][0], 2);
assert_eq!(delivered[1][0], 3);
}
/// Recovery must not be trigger-happy: a frame that is merely late still has
/// to be waited for, or we would discard data the sender is about to resend.
#[test]
fn test_gap_recovery_does_not_fire_before_timeout() {
let (mut client, mut server) = do_handshake();
let frames = make_data_frames(&mut client, 3);
server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[0].clone())).unwrap();
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[2].clone())).unwrap();
assert!(delivered_payloads(&action).is_empty());
// Well inside the timeout — the gap must still be respected.
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[0].clone())).unwrap();
assert!(
delivered_payloads(&action).is_empty(),
"must keep waiting while retransmission is still plausible"
);
// And once the genuinely-late frame shows up, normal in-order delivery
// resumes with nothing dropped.
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[1].clone())).unwrap();
let delivered = delivered_payloads(&action);
assert_eq!(delivered.len(), 2, "late frame plus the buffered one");
assert_eq!(delivered[0][0], 1);
assert_eq!(delivered[1][0], 2);
}
} }